The Critical Decision Vortex: Lessons
From the Emergency Room
Jean‐Francois Coget
California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, CA
Eugene Keller
French Hospital Medical Center, San Luis Obispo, CA

Abstract
The dominant model of decision making, rational decision making, is increasingly challenged by
research on intuitive decision making and emotion. This article contributes to the debate by
articulating a model of how rational decision making, intuitive decision making, and emotion
influence each other: the critical decision vortex. The critical decision vortex emerges from a
discussion between an emergency room (ER) doctor and a management scholar. The experience of
the doctor diagnosing and treating patients in the ER provides the background for a reflection on
decision making in critical conditions. One of the main findings of this collaborative effort is that to
be effective, ER doctors, like managers, need to remain centered in the critical decision vortex; they
need to attend equally to their analytical conclusions, the intuitive hunches that come from their
experience, and remain open and attentive to their emotions.
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Introduction
This article is the result of a collaboration between Jean‐Francois Coget, PhD, an assistant professor
of management at Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo, and Gene Keller, MD, vice‐president for medical affairs
at French Hospital, in San Luis Obispo. Jean‐Francois conducts research on the role that emotions
play in intuitive decision making and rational decision making. Gene has 30 years of experience in
emergency medicine, and directed, among other things, the emergency rooms (ER) at Cedars Sinai’s
medical center and at Children’s Hospital in Los Angeles. Jean‐Francois and Gene met randomly and
discovered a shared interest for decision making in critical situations. Through a series of dialogues,
they elaborated the critical decision vortex, a model of how rational decision making, intuitive
decision making, and emotions interact when doctors make critical decisions in the ER (c.f. Figure
1). Gene represents the “experience” aspect of the “Reflection on experience” piece, whereas Jean‐
Francois represents the academic, who relates Gene’s experience to management theory.
The main point of this article is to describe accurately how experts make critical decisions in
turbulent environments, such as the ER, characterized by high stakes, high stress, rapidity,
incomplete information, overwhelming data, and overlapping processes. Decision‐making models
typically seek to identify neat causal sequences among their variables of interest, such as thoughts,
intuitions, emotions, decisions, or actions, which they describe as discreet phenomena (Chia, 1994).
Yet such models are descriptively inaccurate (Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu, & Salas, 2001). From a
phenomenological point of view, people experience reality in continuous, rather than in discreet
terms (Bohm, 1980; Derrida, 1981). The subjective, moment‐to‐moment experience of a decision
maker is a flow of thinking, intuiting, feeling, and acting, rather than discreet thoughts, intuitions,
emotions, and actions (Chia, 1994; Coget, 2004). While after the fact, decision makers might
retrospectively invent an artificial story that connects sequentially a thought to a decision to taken
an action (Weick, 1995), in the moment, the flows of thinking, intuiting, feeling, and acting interact
with each other in numerous feedback loops, at times reinforcing, competing, or impeding each
other (Coget, 2004). In the environment of the ER, the flow of experience of the doctor as a decision
maker can be characterized as turbulent, reminiscent of rapids. As this article will illustrate,
effective ER doctors navigate the flow of critical decision making by continually shifting between
the three processes of thinking, intuiting, and feeling, a metaprocess that we call the critical
decision vortex, whereas less effective ER doctors tend to ignore one or more of these processes.
The metaphor of a “vortex” attempts to reflect the relentless shifting that occurs among processes
and the lack of apparent order in which the shifts happen. The critical decision vortex model
answers the call from Dane and Pratt (2007) to extend the literature on intuitive decision making
by exploring its interaction with the emotion and the rational decision‐making processes.
Though this article focuses on ER doctors, we believe the critical decision vortex model can apply to
managers, too. As Mintzberg (1975) classically remarked, the manager’s job, far from being
characterized as planning, organizing, coordinating, and controlling, is in fact staccato paced and
demands rapid‐fire action. As work becomes faster paced, more dynamic, and more unpredictable
(Cascio, 2003; Eisenhardt, 2000), the ER can thus be considered as a laboratory of what tomorrow’s
work conditions will be (Klein, Ziegert, Knight, & Xiao, 2006). Because ER doctors routinely have to
make critical decisions, their expertise in doing so might prove useful to managers (Auerbach,
2002), especially those who have to make critical decisions in turbulent environments (Brown &

Eisenhardt, 1997; Khatri & Ng, 2000), such as CEOs in the boardroom, COOs, operations managers,
or financial traders. The critical decision‐making expertise of ER doctors may also be relevant to
any employee working in high‐reliability organizations (Bigley & Roberts, 2001) or in the event of a
crisis (Mitroff, 2004).

In the ER With Dr. Gene Keller
To illustrate the critical decision vortex model, let us follow Gene for an hour in the ER. A glossary
of common medical terms that will be used in this article can be found in appendix. It is mid‐
morning, and Gene is attending to the regular flow of ER patients, about 150 per day. The triage
nurse brings in an elderly woman, approximately in her 80s, who complains of abdominal pains.
Gene sighs. This is the 19th elderly woman complaining of abdominal pain this morning, none of
which turned out to be serious. The last one also complained she had to miss her daily round of golf.
As Gene starts asking the usual diagnostic questions, the lady says: “I’ve tolerated this pain for a few
weeks. Today, it became so acute that I had to come to the ER.” This statement strikes a chord in
Gene, and he warms up to the stoic old lady. This motivates him to focus and to prioritize her care
as immediate rather than defer her for an outpatient evaluation. He mentally consults his diagnosis
algorithm for abdominal pain and orders a variety of tests, including an abdominal ultrasound. He
then continues his diagnostic dialogue, in search for a clue that might help him automatically detect
a pattern that fits one of the cases contained in his vast clinical repertoire, that is, to engage in
intuitive decision making. Meanwhile, the triage nurse bursts into the room: “Doctor, you’ve got to
see the patient in Bed 2. He does not look good.” Gene deputes another nurse to attend the lady and
walks to Bed 2.
Patient 2, a man in his 50s, complains of an excruciating chest pain. This symptom fits the pattern of
acute coronary syndrome, which can mean the patient is having a heart attack. Gene thus follows
the algorithm for the diagnosis of heart attacks. He orders an EKG, a chest X‐ray, blood tests that
evaluate strain or damage to the cardiac muscle, and IV access. Gene then asks the patient to
describe his symptoms in more details. Something about the quality of the patient’s pain strikes
Gene as slightly different from the typical symptoms of a heart attack. In addition to the typical
radiating pain in the chest and throat, the patient’s pain reaches his back. All the other elements of
the patient’s history—his smoking, his mother’s and brother’s heart attacks, and so on—fit the
diagnosis of a heart attack. But the illuminating detail of back pain disturbs Gene’s heart‐attack
algorithm. His intuition alerts him to the possibility that the patient may have a dissecting
aneurysm. If indeed the patient suffers from a dissecting aneurysm and is directed to the Cath lab
for treatment of a heart attack, he will probably die. However, if he is not treated for a heart attack
within 90 min of the initial symptoms, he will suffer irreparable cardiac damage, and possibly die,
in the process. As Gene ponders over this diagnosis, he hears an announcement over the Paramedic
ER radio.
A trauma patient is on his way to the ER. The patient, a young male, has been in a motorcycle
accident. He is unconscious and in shock, with a blood pressure of 80, and has been immobilized
with a back board, with his helmet taped on. The paramedics indicate that they are doing a “scoop
and run”: Due to the potential severity of the case, they are bringing the patient directly to the ER,

with minimal in situ treatment and diagnosis. Major trauma represents only a fraction of the cases
of an ER, 1%, which means 1 or 2 cases per day on average. However, they take up an inordinate
amount of resources and time and are accompanied by an extra dose of drama: A “circus” of
paramedics, firefighters, and/or police is accompanying the victim. Gene’s adrenaline shoots up,
upon hearing the announcement. His trauma algorithm pops up in his mind to help him prepare for
the situation: put the patient in the trauma room, have X‐ray and respiratory therapy stand by, and
have a supply of Type O negative blood available, in case a transfusion is needed. Gene will have to
diagnose this trauma patient very quickly with minimal information.
At this point, Gene has three critical cases in hand, with four or five other patients waiting in line,
who could all potentially have serious conditions. He feels sympathy for the stoic old lady, and
desire to help her; frustration at the problematic and life‐threatening diagnosis of the second
patient with chest pain; and anxiety at the prospect of the “scoop and run” trauma. To keep going,
Gene has to muster his courage and envision his ability to cope with all these cases simultaneously.
He asks whether Patient 1’s results are back. They’re not. He asks whether she’s comfortable and
focuses back on the second patient. Patient 2’s chest X‐ray is back and yields no additional
information to decide the case. His medical history does not yield additional clues either.
The triage nurse interrupts Gene again to tell him that a mother, with Medi‐Cal insurance, is waiting
with her 2‐year old baby. The baby has a fever of 105F degrees, a symptom for which the worst‐
case scenario could be meningitis. The mother is banging on doors, demanding that a doctor see her
baby immediately. Gene calls the hospital’s cardiologist, a friend, and asks him whether he can
come down to the ER to look at Patient 2. As Gene enters Room 3 to see the baby, the mother barks,
“Am I waiting this long and being treated that way because I have Medi‐Cal?” Gene replies, “I didn’t
know your insurance status.” She then asks him, “Is it because I’m Black, then?” Gene now attempts
humor: “Really, you’re Black?” At this point, the trauma case arrives in the ER. Gene tells the mother
he has to see the trauma patient: “I don’t care about the trauma patient. Treat my baby!” Gene’s
already high stress level is exacerbated by the mother’s attitude. He chooses to acknowledge the
mother’s anger, while simultaneously expressing his. He raises his voice: “You’re right, I’ll treat
your baby immediately, and get the nurses to give him something for the fever, but I also have to
treat a major trauma patient!” At this point, Gene takes her hand. “I promise: I will be back within
15 minutes. Look at your watch. I’ll be back.”
Gene enters the trauma room. For a moment, he is overwhelmed. He knows that he will have to
spend an inordinate amount of energy and time to tackle this case, and yet, he has four other critical
cases “cooking.” Gene looks at his team of experienced staff and regains courage. As they start
asking him the usual questions, such as “Which type of IV do you want hung?” their energetic
presence propel him forward. At the same time, given the time pressure, Gene feels annoyed that
the paramedics did not even cut off the patient’s clothes. However, this is not the time to get angry
at them. Every second counts. He thus enlists their help: “Cut the patient’s clothes!” He orders an
additional large‐bore catheter IV to be started, blood drawn, and, in the absence of much diagnostic
information, follows his trauma algorithm. He checks that the patient is breathing properly and
readies for an intubation to be performed. He examines the chest and listens for lung damage. He
examines the pelvic area and notices blood on the tip of the patient’s penis. This indicates a

probable pelvis fracture. He also notices that the patient’s leg is positioned at an awkward angle.
The nurses tell Gene that the patient does not have any visible deformities of the leg: They checked.
He thus concludes that the patient may suffer from a fracture or dislocation of the hip. He carefully
removes the patient’s helmet after checking an X‐ray of the patients neck on the backboard, taking
care not aggravate underlying neck or facial trauma, and orders further X‐rays and a CT‐scan to be
performed.
Emerging from the trauma room, Gene asks whether the cardiologist has returned his call. He
hasn’t; so he calls him back and asks whether he can come down: “I’m on my way.” Gene wipes a
tear from the corner of his eye: “Thank you.” He then goes back to Room 3. He knows he will have to
face the mother’s anger. Some doctors choose to ignore such things, but Gene does not want it to
loom like an elephant in the room and interfere with his work. He thus chooses one more time to
acknowledge the mother’s anger, to start defusing it, and then to enlist her help: “I know you’re
angry, but I really need your help to find out what’s going on with your baby. I also need you to hold
him, to keep him calm while I look at him.” As Gene examines the baby, he notices obvious
symptoms of an ear infection. He sighs in relief: “I’ve got good news! It’s probably only an ear
infection.” Gene checks the baby’s neck for rigidity and quickly does a complete exam. He orders
antibiotics administered and asks the mother to stick around for another 30 min, to make sure that
the antibiotics are having the expected effect. The cardiologist is now with Patient 2, examining
him, and decides that he is just suffering from a classical heart attack. He takes him off to the Cath
lab. While Gene is waiting for the trauma’s test results, he gets results from Patient 1’s tests. The
ultrasound of her abdomen indicates that she has gallstones. He now decides to take a moment for
himself. He goes to the patient’s room, takes her hand, and holds it for 2 minutes. He allows himself
to feel his sympathy for a courageous patient. Providing her with emotional support allows him to
feel good about himself and reset his negative emotions, so that he can recenter himself and
continue to cope with the relentless pace of the ER. More patients are waiting, and Gene gets back in
the ER. This example illustrates several important aspects of critical decision making in the ER:
1. The main task of an ER doctor is to rapidly diagnose patients and treat them. In theory, it occurs
in two parts: Diagnosis is supposed to happen first and be followed by treatment. In practice,
however, the two intersect in multiple feedback loops, with treatment often preceding a full
diagnosis.
2. While diagnosing and treating patients, ER doctors need to constantly monitor and manage their
resources and prioritize their actions to (a) determine which resources maximize diagnosis and
treatment for each patient, (b) minimize demands on the hospital system, (c) prioritize needs
across different patients, and (d) monitor their own capacity limitations (emotion, memory, etc.) to
remain effective in the ER.
3. Each case can be considered as a series of critical decisions. To successfully diagnose and treat
patients, doctors must remain centered in what we call the critical decision vortex. Diagnosis
consists in narrowing down increasing amounts of information about a case to a pattern that can be
acted upon, which happens thanks to three integrated processes: (a) rational decision making, often
in the form of algorithms; (b) intuitive decision making, the automatic recognition of anomalies or
patterns through experience; and (c) emotions. These three functions represent the three poles of

the critical decision vortex, which check and balance each other. Neglecting one pole of the critical
decision vortex can cause ER doctors to make poor decisions such as misdiagnosing patients, or
“spinning around.” In the next section, we discuss the relevant management literature on decision
making.

Reason, Intuition, and Emotion in Management Theory
The bulk of research on decision making has focused on rational decision making. The process of
rational decision making is typically described as (a) defining a problem, (b) identifying relevant
criteria dimensions of the problem, (c) weighing the different criteria in terms of importance, (d)
generating alternative solutions that address the problem, (e) rating each alternative on the
relevant criteria, and (f) choosing the optimal solution (Bazerman, 1998; Kahneman, Slovic, &
Tversky, 1987; Simon, 1968). In medicine, rational decision making often takes the form of well‐
known algorithms, which are taught in medical school and are reinforced throughout the residency
period. Doctors are first taught to classify cases into categories of symptoms, such as “chest pain,”
“abdominal pain,” or “trauma.” They then refine their diagnosis within each of these categories by
asking specific questions and performing specific tests to eliminate certain hypotheses and narrow
down the possible causes to one primary alternative that they can act upon. The logic of the
algorithms is rooted in medical science—statistics and probabilities about different medical
conditions and their treatment, published in medical journals—and tradition—the cumulative
experience of professors of medicine (Groopman, 2007). Technology that complements doctors’
senses, such as X‐ray machines and CT scanners, or knowledge, such as WebMD or even Google
(Tang & Ng, 2006), support doctors’ rational decision‐making process. Doctors’ professional
network of colleagues and specialists can also support their rational decision making by filling in
knowledge gaps or providing second opinions.
An alternative model to rational decision making, intuitive decision making, has recently captured
the attention of management scholars because managers report that they use it more often than
rational decision making (Andersen, 2000), increasingly so, as they climb the professional ladder
(Sadler‐Smith & Shefy, 2004), and because it is faster and more effective under certain conditions
than rational decision making (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Simon, 1987). Intuitive decision making is
characterized as a rapid, nonconscious process that produces affectively charged judgments
through holistic associations (Dane & Pratt, 2007). Upon starting to practice medicine in the field,
interns quickly realize that more experienced doctors reach quick diagnoses and provide expert
care without debating rationally (Groopman, 2007). As they gain more experience, ER doctors
increasingly rely on intuitive decision making. Klein (1993) has vividly illustrated intuitive decision
making in his work with firefighters and soldiers. When making decisions in the field they often do
not generate multiple alternatives and then choose one among them. Rather, skilled firefighters
only generate one feasible course of action and enact it. In intuitive decision making, the cognitive
process of rational analysis and choice is replaced by sizing up a situation and matching it with a
prototypical situation that evokes a given course of action. Research on expert decision making has
clearly established that repeated exposure to specific types of problems through practice and
training is related to the ability to excel in a domain of activity (Ericsson & Charness, 1994). Further
studies of intuitive decision making show that experts often build accounts of the events that could

have led to the current situation, which allows them to better size it up (Kaempf, Klein, Thordsen, &
Wolf, 1996). Experts also use stories to mentally simulate a course of action in the future and evalu‐
ate what will work and what might pose problems (Lipshitz et al., 2001).
Traditionally, emotions were considered to bias rational decision making (e.g., Janis & Mann, 1977).
It was, therefore, advised to ignore or control them, which is still the advice often given to medical
students (Lerner, 2008; Morse, Edwardsen, & Gordon, 2008). Recent research on emotional
intelligence, however, has started to challenge such wisdom (Goleman, 1995; Salovey & Mayer,
1990). There is now a growing body of research evidencing the positive role that emotion can play
in rational decision making (for extensive reviews, see Forgas, 1995; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003)
and intuitive decision making (Burke & Miller, 1999; Hayashi, 2001; Sadler‐Smith & Shefy, 2004).
Damasio (1998), for instance, has provided neurobiological evidence that people cannot make
decisions when the regions of their brain associated with the emotion process have been damaged.
He hypothesizes that critical events leading to strong emotions create somatic markers in a
person’s memory. When faced with similar events, the somatic markers elicit the same emotion in
the person, which helps them make decisions. The somatic marker hypothesis is consistent with
psychological research on emotion and memory, which suggests the existence of affective
associative networks: Individuals experiencing a particular emotion are more likely to attend to
emotion‐congruent stimuli and retrieve memories and action scripts associated with that emotion
(Bower, 1981; Parrott & Spackman, 2000). A large number of studies have also found that positive
affect facilitates the use of intuitive decision making, whereas negative affect, with the exception of
anger, impedes its use in favor of rational decision making (Forgas, 1998; Isen, 2000; Lerner &
Tiedens, 2006).
Research on managerial decision making has underlined the importance of rational decision
making, intuitive decision making, and emotion, the three poles of the critical decision vortex.
However, how the three poles interact is still unclear. Although some research has investigated how
emotion influences rational decision making, little research has investigated how it influences
intuitive decision making, or how intuitive decision making and rational decision making interact
(Dane & Pratt, 2007). In which circumstances do rational decision making, intuitive decision
making, and emotion supplement, complement, or impede each other?
We propose to investigate these questions by observing different configurations of the critical
decision vortex as Gene faces different situations in the ER.

Different Configurations of the Critical Decision Vortex in the ER
Rational decision making is the default pole of the critical decision vortex that ER doctors usually
start with. At the beginning of a diagnosis, when receiving information from the triage nurse,
paramedics, or other ER personnel, doctors classify the case based on the key symptom(s) and then
follow an algorithm designed to figure out the possible causes of the symptom(s). The trauma case
described in our first example illustrates this configuration of the critical decision vortex: In the
absence of much diagnostic information, Gene duly followed his trauma algorithm, aided by his
team. Rational decision making is also the pole of the critical decision vortex that rookie doctors

have to rely on at first, because they do not have enough experience to rely on intuitive decision
making (Groopman, 2007). Gene remembers a case he had to treat during his first few months of
residency in the ER. The patient was a physician in his 60s who complained of severe symptoms of
indigestion after eating fish eggs. The patient remembered that certain foods had caused similar
symptoms in the past. Gene followed the algorithm he had learned in medical school for the
diagnosis of indigestion. Aside from gastrointestinal ailments, indigestion can be symptomatic of
acute coronary syndrome, especially for men in that age range. Gene thus ordered an EKG per‐
formed, to evaluate the patient’s heart condition, and ordered pantoprazole administered, to treat
the symptoms of indigestion. The patient’s symptoms disappeared with the administration of
pantoprazole, and the patient himself indicated that his EKG results looked similar to his previous
EKGs. Gene narrowed down his primary diagnosis to indigestion, and scheduled an in‐depth
gastrointestinal exam for the next day. However, the patient succumbed from a massive heart
attack during his gastrointestinal exam the next day. Gene’s rational decision making was not
sufficient to alert him that the acute coronary syndrome hypothesis was the correct one.
As ER doctors garner more and more experience, they increasingly rely on intuitive decision
making. All of the cases they treat get stored in their memory in more vivid detail than abstract
knowledge, with their associated symptoms. Upon noticing subtle patterns, such as the color of
skin, activity level, angle of limbs, smells, sounds of different organs, and subjective descriptions of
pain, ER doctors are able to immediately diagnose an ailment without conscious need to reason. For
example, a patient was once brought to one of Gene’s interns with pneumonia symptoms. As the
intern described his diagnosis to Gene the latter had a gut feeling and asked the intern, “Does the
patient have a parrot?” The intern looked at Gene aghast: “What does a parrot have to do with the
diagnosis of pneumonia?” Gene repeated, “Have you asked the patient if he has a parrot?” “No.”
“Let’s go see the patient.” Gene asked the patient, “Do you have a parrot?” The patient replied, “As a
matter of fact, yes, and he has been sick. . .” The intern was astounded. Gene had just happened to
come across a few cases of pneumonia caused by bacteria that often target parrots and can pass on
to humans. He recognized subtle cues in the case that prompted him to check whether the patient
had a parrot.
Rational decision making and intuitive decision making can interact in different ways. As seen in
the previous example, or in the example of Gene hesitating about his patient with chest pain
because of the quality of the patient’s pain, intuitive decision making can support rational decision
making by detecting anomalies that technology and rational analysis fail to detect (Klein, 1998).
Intuitive decision making can thus redirect a diagnosis away from the wrong algorithm, preventing
errors and saving lives.
Intuitive decision making can also outperform rational decision making in complex, yet urgent
situations (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Ericsson & Charness, 1994; Simon, 1987). In some cases, Gene just
takes a look at a patient and gets the correct hunch, such as, “This is a urinary tract infection.” The
hunch is then confirmed by further analysis 80% to 90% of the time. Acting on intuitive decision
making to treat patients can be essential, given the limited time that ER doctors have to treat
patients and the limited resources of the ER. Gene recalls a case in which one of the ER doctors
working for him could not save a patient because he was waiting for a CT scan result and the CT

scan was tied up with other critical patients. The doctor was following a rational decision‐making
algorithm, but Gene faulted the doctor for failing to start to provide care based on intuitive decision
making. According to Gene, a good ER doctor starts providing care right away while starting to
diagnose a patient and constantly updates and revises his or her diagnoses and treatments as time
passes and different diagnostic and treatment paths are explored. Technology can not only assist
rational decision making but can also create a dependency that prevents doctors from using
intuitive decision making because the logical process that it follows is external to them. Although
experienced ER doctors sometimes listen to their hunches against what technology tells them, Gene
worries that younger generations of doctors increasingly lose their ability to do so, as they are
increasingly socialized to rely on technology and ignore their senses, as illustrated with the
example of the doctor waiting for the CT scan.
In addition to detecting anomalies or outperforming rational decision making in complex and
urgent situations, intuitive decision making is also useful in synthesizing overwhelming amounts of
information (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Khatri & Ng, 2000). As technology increases the level of details
available, ER doctors are faced with information overload. Though rational decision making cannot
cope rapidly with information overload, intuitive decision making allows expert doctors to rapidly
do so.
Rational decision making can assist intuitive decision making in several ways as well. First, it can
confirm intuitive decision making. This is why doctors order tests to confirm their initial diagnoses.
Rational decision making can also outperform intuitive decision making where the latter fails.
Occasionally, an initial diagnosis stops making sense, forcing doctors to find an algorithm that will
help them progress in their inquiry. They can consult the literature and their colleagues, order tests,
and reflect on the case. Most of the time, for an experienced and effective ER doctor, rational
decision making and intuitive decision making complement and reinforce each other. What about
emotion? What happens when we insert it in the equation?
Traditionally, emotions have been considered detrimental to decision making (e.g., Janis & Mann,
1977). This view is justified in two ways. First, emotions can be understood to be primitive forms of
intuitive decision making, attached to ancient action scripts that in many cases have lost their
relevance in a modern world that has different constraints, threats, and opportunities (Darwin,
1894). For this reason, they can bias judgment by motivating an inappropriate behavior. Gene
illustrates this possibility with the emotions of anger or resentment. The ER sees many difficult
patients such as intoxicated individuals, drug addicts, felons, homeless people, or people driven by
fear. These patients can be uncooperative and violent, as seen in the example of the distraught
mother with a sick baby. Such patients can cause anger in ER doctors. Although Gene has become
inured to abuse, having been insulted, scratched, punched, and even threatened with a gun several
times, he really gets angry at patients who abuse the nurses. Gene has noticed that anger can cause
him to deprioritize patients. Though such a reaction is understandable, it violates the ethical vow of
doctors to treat all patients with an equally amount of care. Second, emotions, especially when they
have a high intensity, have an irresistible quality: They interrupt other cognitive processes,
including decision making (Frijda, 1986). High‐intensity emotions can thus blur decision making,
whether it be intuitive decision making or rational decision making. Gene recalls an incident in

which he had to treat an advanced‐stage leukemia patient whose neck tissues were filling with
blood, which was gradually obstructing his respiration. The patient was male, Gene’s age, and very
similar to him in other ways, which led Gene to identify with him. He was overcome by empathy
and fear. The procedure to save the patient from suffocation was pretty simple, and part of the
basicABC of ER medicine: Gene needed to find an airway and pierce a hole through the neck to
insert a breathing tube.Although the maneuver was made more difficult by the obscuring presence
of blood in the tissue, Gene had performed this maneuver a countless number of times and become
a recognized expert at it. Nonetheless, his overwhelming feelings blurred his judgment, paralyzed
him temporarily, and complicated his finding an airway, which may have compromised care. The
patient ultimately could not be saved.
Although emotions can impede decision making, they can also enhance it in five ways: (1) Emotions
can inform judgment by initiating intuitive decision making or providing diagnostic information for
rational decision making. Gene gives the example of disgust and anger. Upon entering a room, Gene
was overcome by disgust at a foul odor coming from a patient. The patient, a middle‐aged woman,
was complaining of vague symptoms. Gene attended to his feeling of disgust and focused his
attention to the woman’s head. She was wearing a hat. “Do you have any problem with your head?”
“No.” “Can you remove your hat?” She did, and her hair appeared normal. As Gene started to
examine her, he was again overcome with the feeling of disgust and the foul odor, and examined her
hair, which he would not have normally done, given that ER doctors spend an average of 3 min with
each patient. Behind a large clump of hair, the patient had an enormous skin tumor on the scalp,
which produced the foul odor of decaying flesh. She was in complete denial of the symptom, refused
to mention it, and was in fact trying to cover it up. When Gene mentioned the tumor to her, she
explained that she must have been chemically burned by hair dye during her last visit to the
hairdresser. Gene sent the patient to a cosmetic surgeon, where she had to have a large portion of
her scalp removed. In another example, Gene was attending to a young patient, who was suffering
from a bad open fracture of the leg and was unconscious, following an ATV (All Terrain Vehicle)
accident at night. Upon entering the room, Gene felt a mounting anger. He stopped to analyze the
origin of his anger and realized that he was angry at the recklessness of the patient. This prompted
him to check whether the patient was intoxicated. The blood results confirmed that he was. He thus
altered his trauma routine to take into account this condition. Gene’s anger had triggered his
intuition that the patient was intoxicated. (2) Emotions can assist decision making in the ER by
energizing action. This is illustrated by the example of the old lady with gallstones. Gene’s sympathy
for her prevented him from putting her on the backburner during a difficult hour. Although Gene
often feels an extra dose of sympathy for stoic patients, he feels sympathy toward all of his patients.
Sympathy motivates him to keep working on their case even when facing a series of urgent cases. It
heightens his memory, cognitive processes, capacity for multitasking, resistance to stress,
resilience, and hope. Emotions such as sympathy, love, anger can all energize action, which is a key
asset for ER doctors. (3) The particular emotion of empathy is crucial for ER doctors in at least
three ways: (a) Empathy helps doctors to relax patients, which facilitates the administration of care
and leads patient to communicate their symptoms more accurately which helps to diagnose them
better; (b) Doctors who are judged to be empathetic to patients have a much lower incidence of
malpractice lawsuits, regardless of their actual number and gravity of mistakes, because they make
patients feel listened to and cared for (Ambady, LaPlante, Nguyen, & Rosenthal, 2002; Levinson,

Roter, Mullooly, Dull, & Frankel, 1997); and (c) Empathy in itself is a form of care that is useful to
give patients, although it is often overlooked by the medical community (Maguire, 1999; Morse et
al., 2008; Taylor, 1988). Death, for instance, is considered a failure by many doctors. When doctors
see death as inevitable, they thus have a tendency to exit the situation rapidly. Gene’s empathy
always motivated him to ensure that dying patients were comfortable and not suffering
unnecessarily and took care to comfort their family. From a holistic and humanistic perspective, it is
important for both the doctor and the patients to have a human rather than just a technical interac‐
tion. (4) Emotions help doctors recognize their limits and manage themselves so that they don’t
“spin around” or overtax themselves to the point of making mistakes. (5) Finally, emotions
influence doctors and nurses’ implicit moral judgment when they attribute the limited resources of
the hospital and prioritize cases. As illustrated in the first example, a baby, as opposed to an elderly
patient for instance, attracts an extra level of attention by the ER personnel and often receives
priority. This finding was originally formulated by Glaser and Strauss (1964), who observed that
nurses place an implicit social value on dying patients. Although ER doctors’ ethics commands them
to avoid preferential treatment, they are nonetheless routinely faced with dilemmas where they
have to assign priorities to different cases. Although they base those decisions on several factors,
such as severity, urgency, and treatability of cases, they also rely on emotions as cues that greatly
influence the implicit social value they assign to patients.

Discussion and Conclusion
Based on Gene’s experience and Jean‐Francois’s knowledge of the decision making and emotion
literatures, we have a model of how rational decision making, intuitive decision making, and
emotion interact. For an ER doctor, each case can be considered as a series of critical decisions that
determine the progress of the diagnosis and treatment and the occurrence of critical mistakes.
Critical decisions occur within what we call the critical decision vortex, which features three poles:
rational decision making, intuitive decision making, and emotion. For doctors to make the right
decisions, they need to remain centered within the critical decision vortex, allowing rational
decision making, intuitive decision making, and emotion to inform, balance, and complement each
other. When one of the poles is privileged at the exclusion of the other poles, the doctor risks
committing a mistake or decreasing the quality and speed of his or her diagnosis and treatment.
Though intuitive decision making and rational decision making can point in different directions,
they can complement each other: intuitive decision making can alert rational decision making to
revisit an earlier diagnosis or provide a fast diagnosis in urgent cases where the process of rational
decision making would be too slow. Rational decision making can take over intuitive decision
making where the later dead‐ends and confirm or refine intuitive decision making. Though
overwhelming emotions can interrupt both intuitive decision making and rational decision making,
emotions of lower intensity provide valuable diagnosis information for rational decision making,
can initiate intuitive decision making, energize action, facilitate empathy, help doctors recognize
their own limits, and help them solve moral dilemmas.
Although this model is only based on the experience of one person, Dr. Keller, it yields a rich,
organic understanding of how rational decision making, intuitive decision making, and emotion
interact. Some intuition researchers have noted that most models of decision making are based on

theory or on laboratory experiments using nonexpert college students making decisions in
simplified contexts. Such contexts vary radically from the contexts in which experts often have to
make decisions, which are characterized by “ill‐structured problems, uncertain, dynamic
environments, shifting, ill‐defined, or competing goals, multiple event‐feedback loops, time
constraints, [and] high stakes” (Lipshitz et al., 2001, p. 334). We, therefore, join the intuition
researchers’ call for the naturalistic observation of experts making decision in their natural setting
to build descriptively accurate models of decision making.
The critical decision vortex contributes to the literature on decision making by suggesting that the
distinction between thought, intuition, emotion, and action is more blurry than often considered in
the literature. The diagnosis arrived at by an ER doctor is the result of a series of overlapping and
interacting bouts of rational decision making, intuitive decision making, emotion, and action. When
Gene recalled different incidents in the ER, he often found it difficult to neatly separate the
processes governing the three poles of the critical decision vortex, which contributed to our
decision to use the word vortex. This observation is consistent with Dewey’s (2002) psychological
theory. Dewey considered that human behavior was the result of three interacting factors:
intelligence, which approximates rational decision making; habit, which approximates intuitive
decision making; and impulse, which approximates emotion. The field of organizational behavior
might benefit from bringing Dewey’s work back into contemporary theorizing, which has started to
be done by Adler and Obstfeld (2007), who used it to extend current research on creativity. It
would also be interesting to extend the critical decision vortex model by comparing and contrasting
it with Dewey’s theory.
We believe that the critical decision vortex model opens up avenues for further research. One
possibility would be to explore the role that specific emotions play in the critical decision vortex.
For example, in the case of ER doctors, we have seen that the emotion of empathy is crucial for
helping them to elicit more and better quality diagnostic information from the patients and is an
element of care in and of itself. We have also seen that the emotions of sympathy and anger
energize action. However, anger can also bias doctors’ judgment and affect the quality of the care
they provide. Anger would, therefore, be an interesting emotion to study within the critical decision
vortex context. Another interesting avenue would be to explore the role of emotion regulation in
the critical decision vortex. Whereas it is useful to regulate some overwhelming emotions, it is also
useful to attend to other emotions. What types of emotion regulation strategies work best to filter
detrimental emotions out and allow helpful emotions in?

Practical Implications
Implications for managers can be derived from the critical decision vortex model. We will separate
them into two categories. First, we will explore the individual, team, and organizational practices
that could potentially enhance critical decision‐making effectiveness. Second, we will explore the
kind of traits and skills that may help individuals effectively navigate the critical decision vortex.

Practices That Could Potentially Enhance Critical DecisionMaking
Effectiveness
First and foremost, the critical decision vortex model can help practitioners by demystifying
decision making in turbulent environments and describing it more accurately than traditional
decision‐making models. Awareness of what the vortex feels like should allow decision makers to
identify more clearly the different processes they experience in critical situations, and how they
interrelate, and prevent them for experiencing guilt for not following strictly the traditional rational
decision‐making model. This should help them improve their critical decision‐making effectiveness
because expert performance has been shown to improve when practitioners receive accurate but
gentle feedback (Ericsson & Charness, 1994). The critical decision vortex model can also help
practitioners recognize and avoid the most likely pitfalls of critical decision making: ignoring one or
more of the poles of the vortex and “spinning around.” Aside from this first practical implication,
our survey of the management literature and of effective practices in the ER has yielded three
practices that could potentially enhance critical decision‐making effectiveness:
(a)apprenticeship,(b)regular peer‐review sessions, and (c) reflecting on action.
The first practice that we believe might help improve critical decision‐making skills is the
organizational practice of apprenticeship. The model of apprenticeship was first developed during
the Middle Ages. Young professionals aspiring to learn a specific craft would work under a guild
master for about 7 years until they were themselves recognized as masters (Epstein, 1998).
Following the guild tradition, the medical field still requires young doctors to go through a long
period of residency training. During their residency, they receive daily feedback about their
decisions from experienced doctors, which tremendously improves their critical decision‐making
ability (Groopman, 2007). Though business school students still occasionally intern in business
organizations before they formally enter the workforce, they might benefit from a more structured
apprenticeship system, like the one used in the medical field.
A second practice that may help improve critical decision‐making skills is the organizational or
team practice of regular peer‐review sessions. Hospitals routinely conduct peer‐review sessions
during which they examine cases in which unsatisfactory decisions have been made. The goal of
these sessions is not to assign blame or take disciplinary measures but rather to help the medical
personnel develop their decision‐making ability. Peer feedback sessions help ER doctors continue
to analyze and improve their critical decision‐making effectiveness beyond the residency period.
Business organizations might benefit from such a practice. Though periodic performance
evaluation sessions are routinely conducted in business organizations, these sessions are
essentially tied to rewards and punishments; thus, they are likely to raise defensiveness in the
participants and detract from learning (Argyris, 1991). It might, therefore, be effective to conduct
routine peer feedback sessions aimed at improving performance that are separate from periodic
performance evaluation sessions, as suggested by Culbert (2008).
Aligned with the first two practices, the management literature suggests a third, individual practice
that may help practitioners improve their critical decision‐making abilities: reflective practice
inquiry (Schön, 1983). Reflective practice involves, among other things, journaling , questioning
one’s frames, and conducting personal experiments (for more details, see Schön, 1983). Despite

being originally developed within the field of management, the concept of reflective practice has
received more attention in fields such as nursing (Getliffe, 1996; Hahnemann, 1986) or education
(McCrindle & Christensen, 1995). The critical decision vortex model reemphasizes its importance in
the business field.

Traits and Skills Potentially Associated With Effective Critical Decision Making
Beyond the aforementioned practices, it might be useful to identify traits and skills associated with
effective critical decision making. This may prove useful in the selection of effective critical decision
makers and the development of critical decision‐making training programs. Four types of traits and
skills may help individuals successfully navigate the critical decision vortex: those that (a) enhance
intuitive decision‐making effectiveness, (b) enhance rational decision‐making effectiveness, (c)
enhance the effective utilization and management of emotions, and (d) help individuals to balance
the three poles of the vortex, keep attending to each of them, and prevents them from “spinning
around.” Based on these four categories, we have established the following tentative list of helpful
skills and traits: high degree of situational awareness, capacity for mindfulness, high level of
expertise, high IQ, high emotional intelligence, active listening skills, capacity for ego
transcendence, strong action orientation, and a high degree of conscientiousness. We now go over
each category of traits and skills in more details.
Situational awareness, the capacity to perceive environmental elements within a volume of time
and space, to comprehend their meaning, and to project their status in the near future (Blandford &
William Wong, 2004; Endsley, 1995, 1997); mindfulness, the capacity to be aware of one’s internal
condition and external situation as fully and as consciously as possible (Jullien, 1996; Sun‐tzu,
1988; Weick & Putnam, 2006; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006); and expertise (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Ericsson
& Charness, 1994), have all been shown to improve intuitive decision‐making effectiveness. High IQ
has been associated with a higher rational decision‐making effectiveness (Frederick, 2005),
whereas emotional intelligence, the capacity to perceive, understand, use, and manage emotions
(Salovey & Mayer, 1990) is, by definition, associated with the effective management of the
emotional pole of the critical decision vortex and has been shown to enhance various types of work
outcomes (Goleman, 1998; Goleman, Boyatzis, & McKee, 2002; Huy, 1999). A strong action
orientation (Diefendorff, Hall, Lord, & Strean, 2000) and a high degree of conscientiousness
(Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1991; Marrick & Mount, 1991) could help decisions makers avoid “spinning
around.” Finally, good active listening skills (Rogers & Farson, 1979) and ego transcendence
(Parameshwar, 2005; Peterson, Driver‐Linn, & DeYoung, 2002; Peterson et al., 2003) may help
them to incorporate the input of others and, therefore, attend to all of the poles of the vortex. The
traits, skills, and practices that we have identified as possibly enhancing critical decision‐making
effectiveness are of course tentative. Further studies are needed to investigate their validity.
In this article, we hope to have contributed to the decision‐making literature by providing a model
that starts to answer the call of intuitive decision‐making scholars to integrate intuitive, rational,
and emotional processes (Dane & Pratt, 2007). The model suggests a number of practical
implications that can potentially help managers be more effective when making critical decisions.
We hope that further research will extend, validate, and critique the model to further our
understanding of critical decision making.

Appendix
Glossary of Key Medical Terms Used in this Article
ABC of ER medicine: a mnemonic that stands for “Airway, Breathing, and Circulation.”
Cath lab: an examination room equipped to support the catheterization procedure, where a
catheter is inserted into a large artery, to diagnose and treat heart attacks.
CT‐scan: computer assisted axial tomography: a medical imaging method that generates a three‐
dimensional image of the inside of a patient.
Diagnosis algorithm: a sequence of instructions that doctors follow to make a diagnosis based on
certain symptoms. The instructions may include a particular set of questions to ask patients,
a set of medical tests to order, and a decision sequence based on the results of these tests.
Dissecting aneurysm: a localized widening of an artery in which the artery’s wall rips longitudinally.
EKG: electrocardiogram.
IV: an intravenous drip system used to administer fluids and medication quickly.
Intubation: a procedure in which tubes are inserted in the throat, and sometimes the lungs, to assist
respiration.
Medi‐Cal: a state‐sponsored medical insurance to assist underprivileged children in California.
Pantoprazole: a drug used for short‐term treatment of erosion and ulceration of the esophagus.
Spinning around: a term used in the ER to refer to moments when a doctor does not know which
actions to prioritize any longer and looses precious time hesitating between them.
Trauma patient: refers to victims of accidents: car accident, motorcycle accident, high‐fall accident,
gunshot wounds, and so on.
Triage nurse: the nurse who makes a first assessment of incoming patients and prioritizes them.
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